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I desire of the philosophers to grant, that there 
is in some (I believe in many) human breasts, a kind and 
benevolent disposition, which is gratified by contributing 
to the happiness of others. That in this gratification 
alone, as in friendship, in parental and filial affection, 
and indeed in general philanthropy, there is a great and 
exquisite delight. That if we will not call such disposition 
love, we have no name for it. 
--Henry Fielding 





This thesis originated in a dawning recognition I experienced while 
reading the works of the existentialist psychologist Viktor Frankl, founder 
of a psychotherapeutic approach he calls existential analysis or "logotherapy. 
Logotherapy, as its name suggests, is a theory and a method centrally concerned 
with the meaning of life for different individuals. Frankl's thesis is that 
people do not simply seek satisfaction of their biological needs and psychological 
drives or instincts, they also need meaning: not just survival but something 
to live for; not absence of suffering but a way to make something out of one's 
suffering, and out of oneself through one's suffering. Frankl argues that this 
"dimension" of meaning has been largely excluded from modern psychological 
theories, resulting in a conception of human nature that he sees as a potentially 
destructive caricature. 
In the course of developing this view, Frankl directs much of his 
critical scrutiny at Freud. Drawing on the work of phenomenologist philosophers, 
in particular Max Scheler, Frankl develops a general critique of reductionism 
in psychology. He uses this as a context for questioning theories of human 
motivation, such as Freud's, that are based on notions of drives and stimulus 
reduction derived originally from studies in animal psychology. In particular, 
Frankl criticizes the assumption that the desire for a certain inner state— 
"pleasure" or reduction of tension—is the true source of any action, no 
matter what its apparent object. For such a notion if considered to apply 
universally (Frankl does not deny that such a description would often apply) 
would destroy meaning as Frankl understands it. For him meaning involves 
valuing people and things as ends in themselves, not as means to achieving 
an underlying goal such as reduction of tension. 
< 
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The recognition I experienced involved a growing awareness that this 
all sounded extremely familiar. It echoed to a startling extent the arguments 
of an eighteenth century moral philosopher and theologian, Joseph Butler, 
Bishop of Durham (1692-1752), whose debate with the egoist philosophers 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Bernard Mandeville (c. 1697-1733) Frank! seemed 
to be directly continuing. It seemed to me that while eighteenth century moral 
philosophy is not the tradition on which Frank! specifically draws, it is to 
the theory of philosophical egoism which was canvassed in that setting that 
his opposition is really addressed. This theory states, as formulated by a 
modern student of the period, that "all men are wholly selfish all the time; 
or that no man ever acts save for the sake of some future state of his own 
2 
(mental or physical) person." 
While the Freudian pleasure principle figures prominently in Frankl's 
work as a foil for elaboration of his own position, it is the theory of 
philosophical egoism with which his criticisms really connect. The question 
of how centrally or consistently Freud was committed to that theory is not 
considered by him in any thorough way. Accordingly it seemed to me that the 
eighteenth century anti-egoist writers, especially Butler, might provide 
valuable insights applicable to Frankl's contemporary discussion. Exploration 
of these contributions constitutes the heart of my paper, to be found in 
Section IV. 
The rest of the paper evolved out of considering some more general 
aspects of the relevance of philosophy to psychology, of which my main 
discussion constitutes in a sense a case study. In Section I, I have presented 
some general considerations about the special nature of philosophical questions, 
and their often undetected presence in other, apparently more technical or 
■ 
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empirical, fields of study. There is a vast literature on these issues, and 
I have not attempted to do justice to all sides and all versions of the 
arguments. Drawing on the philosophy of science of the modern philosopher 
Joseph Agassi, I suggest that scientific fields tend to contain both 
1) unexamined philosophical assumptions and 2) an implicit philosophy of 
science, which has been called naive empiricism and more recently logical 
positivism, denying that any philosophical assumptions are being made. Insofar 
as psychology has developed in a scientific context, especially within the 
medical field of psychiatry, considerations about the relevance of philosophy 
to science in general form a background for the recognition of philosophical 
issues, and also of naive empiricist assumptions, in psychology. 
Section II examines Frankl's elucidation of some philosophical issues 
in psychology that he thinks have been too much ignored. His claim that 
"every school of psychotherapy has a concept of man, although this concept is 
3 
not always held consciously" is contrasted with Freud's position that the 
Weltanschauung of psychoanalytic thought is simply that of science. I explore 
Frankl's objections to reductionism, and the "dimensional ontology" that he 
proposes, instead, in order to reconcile different levels of explanation in 
psychology. Debates over reductionism continue fiercely in almost every 
field, and here again I have confined myself to drawing selectively on points 
I found useful. 
In Section III two arguments Frank! brings to bear on the thesis that 
pleasure is the only real object of desire are presented: 1) Direct pursuit 
of pleasure is, as a practical matter, self-defeating, and is observed only 
in pathological (neurotic) states. 2) A theory of motivation based on instincts 
and the striving to maintain homeostasis denies any real involvement of 
an individual with the outside world, postulating a sort of motivational 
' 
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solipsism inconsistent with the search for meaning. This second point is 
the one Frankl attaches most importance to; and it is, as I have suggested 
above, not so much a point against the Freudian pleasure principle as a point 
against philosophical egoism. 
Philosophical egoism as a theory is described in Section IV, with 
examples from Hobbes and Mandeville. Much of the section is devoted to 
developing in detail Butler's supposed refutation of egoism, which turns out 
to be a refutation not of the theory as such, but of one influential a priori 
argument for the theory. This argument represents the egoist thesis as 
necessarily or logically true. Briefly, this argument runs: All my desires 
are desires of mine; The satisfaction I will get from fulfilling them is 
also mine; Therefore I am really acting, whatever the circumstances, to secure 
my own satisfaction; And this entails that it is my own well-being, rather 
than anyone else's or anything else, to which I am entirely devoted. 
Butler's reply really dismantles this argument, for he points out that 
in the middle of it a shift is made between two very different concepts of 
self-interest. The sense in which all actions and motives are to be considered 
self-interested simply because they belong to the self, applies equally to the 
whole spectrum of actions from rapacious to generous, resentful to magnanimous, 
cruel to compassionate. This is an important and real form of egoism, as we 
can learn from the many spiritual disciplines which aim at extinguishing or 
transforming desire in just this sense.4 But it is a different form of egoism 
from the one recognized in colloquial distinctions between "selfish" and 
"unselfish" deeds. Recognition that all actions are selfish in the first 
sense might have many possible consequences, but it does not justify the 
conclusion that all apparently unselfish actions can be known, a priori, to 
be in fact selfish in the second, colloquial sense. In particular, recognition 

5 
of the pervasiveness of selfishness in the first sense gives no support to 
the presumption that behind every action of an apparently disinterested or 
unselfish kind lies a specifiable ulterior motive aiming directly at some 
kind of pleasure or satisfaction for the agent. 
Many of the examples offered by Hobbes and Mandeville rely on exactly 
this unsound conclusion, for example, Hobbes' celebrated definition of pity 
as fear for ourselves occasioned by the sight of the misfortune of another. 
The importance of Butler's demonstration that the general argument is flawed 
is that it deprives the specific examples of a compelling logical backing, 
without which they face a requirement to be individually plausible and 
convincing that they often do not meet. 
I maintain that this flawed general argument, which seems to establish 
the conclusions of philosophical egoism as logically inescapable, lends a sort 
of atmosphere of obviousness to assumptions made in motivation theory that are 
actually far from obvious. And these are the assumptions that Frankl is, first, 
bringing to light and, second, trying to dispute. I think that the motivational 
solipsism of philosophical egoism, like epistemological solipsism (the view 
that there is no reason to believe in the existence of any consciousness but 
my own) cannot be formally refuted. But many new kinds of questioning are 
opened up by recognizing that it is not the uncontroversial finding of common 
sense that it might at first appear to be. 
The last section, Section V, on philosophy and psychology, considers the 
question of how the concerns of moralists can have importance for psychologists 
not interested in making moral judgments as such. A link is found through 
Freud's extremely powerful thesis that a person may be unconscious of many 
or most of his/her motives, with the resulting search for motives which are 




equation of true motive with selfish motive (in the stronger sense), can be 
influential or determinative in guiding that search. The psychological 
theory, widely accepted by many who depart from Freud in other ways, and well 
established in our popular culture, tells us that we need to probe for non- 
obvious underlying purposes; a philosophical theory may tell us what we 
should expect these to look like when we find them. Philosophical egoism tells 
us that only a selfish motive is even a candidate to be considered a true 
motive. Hence it seems obvious—though it is not, from the point of view of 
Butler's critique of the logical backing of the theory—that motives other than 
those Freud called instinctual should be passed over in this search and 
regarded as derivative. 
Ultimately Frankl's argument with Freud concerns where the search for 
explanation should stop, in considering human motives. Frankl's contention 
that it should stop when it reaches something "authentic" and "truly human" 
must be considered uninformative. But his challenge locates freedom and 
responsibility not only with patients but also with psychologists. He suggests 
that we are required to make decisions about what concerns we are prepared to 
recognize as "authentic"; these decisions have a philosophical and perhaps also 
a moral basis. He does not supply us with guiding principles for making these 
decisions, but only with a warning against uncritically accepting guiding 
principles that are too restrictive, especially those derived from heuristic 
theoretical simplifications, in reductionist psychological theories, that have 
been made and then forgotten. 
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I. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: PERSISTING BACONIAN DICHOTOMIES AND 
THE ROLE OF THEORY 
Philosophy is often characterized as a field in which no progress is 
made, no results are achieved, and the same questions are discussed for 
millenia without seeming even to come closer to being solved. Certainly the 
question of philosophical egoism falls in this category, as proponents and 
opponents of egoist views can be found in every era, at least as far back as 
the ancient Greeks. Other such questions have traditionally included such 
topics as the relation of mind and matter, the capacity of human thinking to 
attain to truth, the nature of knowledge, free will and determinism, and 
the potential for good and evil in human nature. Since we evidently manage 
to get along in the absence of consensus on these matters, and even in the 
absence of consensus about what the questions really mean and how they should 
be formulated, it might seem that we do not really need to answer them or 
even to concern ourselves with them at all. This view receives some support 
from the attitudes of many modern philosophers themselves. The English moral 
philosopher C. D. Broad, for example, wrote at the end of his classic book 
Five Types of Ethical Theory that in his view ethical theory is of no 
importance to anyone but ethical theorists, and that, fortunately for us 
all, the actual moral life of mankind is conducted without reference to 
the changing fashions in that specialized branch of academic entertainment.^ 
At the opposite extreme is the view of Viktor Frankl, that prevalent opinions 
on philosophical questions shape events very directly. Frankl, whose work 
was significantly shaped by his observations and experiences as a concentration 
camp prisoner, has said, "In any case, I believe it to be a straight path 
from [the] homunculist image of man to the gas chambers of Auschwitz, 





This pathology [the pathology of the Zeitgeist], if one could 
describe it, is marked by provisional, fatalistic, conformist, 
and fanatic attitudes to life which can easily mount to the 
proportions of a psychic epidemic. Somatic epidemics are typical 
results of war; psychic epidemics ar^ possible causes of war, 
and thus of new concentration camps/ 
Academic philosophy, especially in the English-speaking world, has 
been occupied increasingly with discussion of the nature of philosophy 
itself. Philosophers have been occupied with a sort of second-order or 
metaphilosophical questioning about what questions philosophers should be 
asking, and what sorts of answers they can expect to find. This is an 
ancient theme with a lineage reaching back at least to Socrates; however, the 
modern preoccupation with it is distinctively shaped by an intellectual 
setting in which "scientific" and "rational" tend to be readily equated, and 
philosophy is somewhat on the defensive. Different schools of philosophy, 
such as the analytic and the phenomenological, are defined fundamentally by 
their different interests and methods. Starting from different conceptions of 
the nature of philosophy, they hardly intersect enough to offer differing 
views on the same issues. 
Discussions of the nature of philosophy have involved efforts to 
understand what gives traditional philosophical questions, such as those 
about mind and matter, free will and determinism--often referred to as 
"metaphysical" questions-- their persistent and unresolvable character. Many 
attempts have been made to trace this to some flaw or underlying incoherence 
in the questions themselves. This was the approach of Kant and more recently, 
in a very different way, of Wittgenstein. Frank! follows Spinoza in 
suggesting that the flaws in the questions are not isolated, but rather 
reveal contradictions or problems in our habitual ways of thinking which 
require more than intellectual effort to overcome. For example, he views 
questions about how mind and matter can "interact" as unanswerable because 
. 
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it is an illusion to regard them, as we do in framing this question and 
also in our everyday experience, as separate. 
The group of early twentieth century philosophers of science known as 
Q 
the logical positivists maintained that all metaphysical questions and 
statements are "meaningless," only seeming to have meaning because they are 
cast in familiar grammatical forms. This in turn was based on an attempt 
to equate "meaning" with "method of verification": metaphysical statements 
have no meaning because they have no method of verification. That is, they 
are so broad that any and all observations can be construed as consistent 
with them. An example of a hypothesis of this type, that would be impossible 
to verify, is the nineteenth century anti-evolutionist view that the world 
was created as described in the Bible all at once, containing a fossil record, 
and other misleading evidence suggesting a long period of gradual change,in 
order to test our faith. This theory is by design compatible with all the 
phenomena adduced as evidence for the opposite view, so it cannot be verified. 
Another example would be the hypothesis that everything is shrinking and 
expanding regularly at exactly the same rate; there would be no way to observe 
this, since measuring implements would be shrinking and expanding too.*® 
Verification itself proved difficult to define rigorously, a problem 
that Sir Karl Popper addressed in his philosophy of science by shifting the 
emphasis from verification to falsification. In his view a statement is 
meaningful, or scientific, only if there are conditions for its falsification 
that can be specified, that is, if it is not compatible with all possible 
observations. In his view a theory is metaphysical, and thereby unscientific, 
if it cannot in principle be falsified. Popper bases his opposition to both 
Freud and Marx on identifying such a "self-sealing" character in their 
arguments. He feels that both these systems of thought have built-in devices 
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for automatically transforming all proposed counterexamples and criticisms 
into further evidence supporting their views. This would apply, for example, 
to the explaining away of all opposition to psychoanalysis as "resistance. 
Joseph Agassi, a former student of Popper, has attempted to reinstate 
metaphysics by arguing that it may play a legitimate and valuable role in 
generating scientific hypotheses. Popper's conception of science as 
"conjectures and refutations" opened the way for this by allowing that a 
scientific hypothesis is not marked by the special method by which it is 
found: according to his scheme, Kekule's dream of the structure of the benzene 
ring, for example, is as good a source of a scientific hypothesis as any 
other, provided the hypothesis can be tested. Popper leaves open the question 
of how we are to decide which hypotheses are worth bothering to test, since 
time and resources are not available to test them all. In practice, this does 
seem to have something to do with how they were arrived at, and by whom (Kekule 
was, after all, an organic chemist), though the theoretical issue remains 
unsolved. In any case, Popper left room for Agassi to suggest a role for 
metaphysics in generating scientific hypotheses, and in providing overarching 
frameworks or regulating principles which cannot themselves be tested but which 
have consequences that can. These regulating conceptions may also help to 
orient our judgment about which hypotheses are worth testing. Agassi is not 
worried about the question of how the "right" regulating principles are to be 
chosen, lacking formal criteria for establishing their truth, for he is a 
pluralist and believes work should proceed along many lines at once, with 
fruitful discussion of differences. His name for this is "methodological 
tolerance."^ 
Agassi points out that our intellectual climate, especially our thinking 
about science and its relation to philosophy, is strongly influenced by a 
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dichotomy between speculation and empirical investigation, inherited from 
Francis Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science. Speculation figures in 
this scheme as the enemy of the true scientific attitude; for Bacon it 
represented a heinous moral, as well as intellectual fault. Agassi says, 
Almost every classical or contemporary history of science 
bears the stamp of Francis Bacon's philosophy of science. Bacon's 
philosophy divides thinkers into two categories variously 
characterised as right and wrong, scientific and superstitious, 
open-minded and dogmatic, observer of facts and speculant. The 
open-minded person, according to this view, can observe and 
record facts as they are, as they appear to his eyes accidentally; 
he does not form any opinion until significant facts lead him to 
a sound--i.e., scientific-judgment. The prejudiced and 
superstitious person, on the other hand, starts by speculating, 
by conjuring a hypothesis, and so sees the world as in a distorting 
mirror. As he sees only the distorted image of the facts which 
refute his theory, he is in no position to correct his views by 
bringing them into accord with these facts; and since he can never 
see that he has made a mistake, he will continue to see facts 
distorted. Thus trapped by a vicious circle inside his distorting 
view, he will be unable to avoid adopting a dogmatic attitude 
towards it. 
This leads to the ready assumption, often challenged but persistently 
influential, that the two approaches are entirely mutually exclusive, and 
that the results of science can therefore be considered to be free of 
speculation and hence of dogma and bias. 
This philosophy leads the historian to attempt to record without 
bias all the facts as they are; yet once a person, historian or 
not, accepts a division of mankind into open-minded and closed? 
minded, he almost invariably finds himself on the right side. 
A further consequence is that the open-minded/closed-minded, scientific/ 
unscientific distinction, originally meant to be awarded on the basis of 
method, is all too easily awarded on the basis of content, especially in 
retrospect. For if we consider our current beliefs to be based on open- 
minded and truly scientific examination of the facts, then open-minded 
and truly scientific thinkers of the past are easily identified as those 
whose views agree with, or at least anticipate, our own. After all, ours are 
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the views that we believe sound empirical method, applied by anybody at 
any time, would support. 
Agassi points out that in view of the changing nature of modern 
scientific theories, potential embarrassment awaits inductivist historians of 
science engaged in judging the figures of the past along these lines. This is 
why, he says, inductivist histories of science must be periodically rewritten, 
so that credit for anticipating modern scientific understanding can be 
redistributed in better accordance with current belief. Baconian inductivism, 
with its simplistic belief in a totally sharp distinction between facts and 
theories, cannot account adequately for controversy or for radical change in 
science, and these aspects have to be minimized in inductivist histories and 
philosophies of science. 
Thomas Kuhn is perhaps the best known popularizer of the anti-Baconian 
view that all observations or facts are theory-laden, and that empiricism 
cannot, therefore, be cleanly purged of speculation's inductivists would like.^ 
Kuhn's notion of science as governed by a succession of incommensurable 
paradigms entails that the science of any age has governing assumptions, not 
themselves proved by the methods of the science, that shape those methods and 
define the problems to which they are applied. Kuhn sees no rational basis for 
choosing among rival sets of assumptions; he frames explanations of paradigm 
shifts in terms of the sociology, not the methodology, of science: 
Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the 
transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at 
a time, forced by logic and neutral experience. Like the gestalt 
switch, it must occur all at once (though not necessarily in an 
instant) or not at all. 
Ultimately his theory is in agreement with the observation that he cites from 
Max Planck's autobiography, that 
...a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its 
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its 
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opponents eventuajjy die, and a new generation grows up that is 
familiar with it. 
It is consistent with a Baconian inductivist position that philosophy 
as such, except when limited analysis of scientific concepts, as the positivists 
proposed, must be rejected as "speculation," representing an illicit attempt 
to sidestep the requirement for evidence and observation. Its prominence, on 
this view, would be expected to diminish steadily as scientific understanding 
advances. Speculation is never to be considered legitimate; it flourishes 
best, however, where no real knowledge is yet available to make it unnecessary. 
The status of these views themselves, insofar as they might fall into the 
category of unacceptable speculation, is not addressed; one cannot glibly 
say, however, that this shows the theory is false because self-contradictory. 
A similar problem arises in connection with Kuhn's philosophy, for his own 
views seem to be presented as transcending all paradigms, causing his theory 
to be a self-reflexive criticism of itself. This is a form of an old question 
with many versions: is a relativist inconsistent in claiming validity for the 
relativist position? That is, does that claim itself appeal to a concept of 
(non-relative) truth which the relativist has renounced? 
What this brief and incomplete account of controversy in the field of 
philosophy of science is meant to bring out is a criticism that has been made 
many times by critics of Baconian and positivist thinking. This criticism is 
that the view that philosophy has no role in science represents, itself, a 
particular philosophical position. Another way of saying this has been that 
rejection of metaphysics as "unscientific" or "meaningless" is itself a 
piece of metaphysics. Furthermore, as a metaphysical view, it is peculiarly 
barricaded against controversy, since the appropriate philosophical criticisms 
and counterclaims are not acknowledged to be applicable. 
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Agassi cites an example of the persisting influence of Baconian 
dichotomies from a lecture on "Science and History" by Professor Douglas 
McKie, a modern historian of science: 
A historian of science, says McKie, may be personally interested 
in the philosophy of science, as he himself is; qua historian, 
however, he has no use for it; his business if simply to study 
the rise of scientific ideas as it took place "in fact with the 
scientific detail of experiment and observation from which these 
ideas emerged." Professor McKie emphasizes that his is the 
majority view, and he is right. But the majority view need not 
be correct; to argue that the philosophy of science is irrelevant 
to the study of the emergence of scientific ideas from facts is 
barely feasible because the philosophy of science is largely about 
whether scientific ideas do emerge from facts. 
This historian has not, as he claims, managed qua historian to eschew 
philosophy; rather, he has taken a position, on a philosophical issue of 
special relevance to his field, that seems to him so obvious that he does not 
recognize it as a philosophical position at all. 
The Baconian view that scientific observation is free of assumptions, 
in spite of being widely criticized by modern philosophers of science, retains 
a sufficiently strong hold to be considered by some people self-evidently 
true. In the "social sciences," where philosophies of science have arguably 
had more influence than in the natural sciences themselves, it is particularly 
necessary to be aware of the possible presence of unrecognized assumptions, of 
which the most central is the Baconian conviction that no unrecognized assumptions 
have been made. This is the context for approaching Frankl's efforts to 





II. PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN METAPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: THE 
WORK OF VIKTOR FRANKL 
Viktor Frank! has brought the challenge of articulating and 
criticizing unacknowledged philosophical assumptions to bear on meta¬ 
psychology and psychotherapy, referring to what he calls the "metaclini cal" 
aspects of psychotherapy. 
The metaclinical implications of psychotherapy refer mainly to 
its concept of man and philosophy of life. There is no 
psychotherapy without a theory of man and a philosophy of life 
underlying it. Wittingly or unwittingly, psychotherapy is based 
on them. In this respect psychoanalysis is no exception. 
Every school of psychotherapy has a concept of man, although 
this concept is not always held consciously. It is up to us to 
make it conscious. We who have learned so much from Freud need 
scarcely point out how dangerous the unconscious can become. We 
must make explicit the implicit concept of man in psychotherapy. 
For a psychotherapist's concept of man, under certain circumstances, 
can reinforce the patient's neurosis, can be wholly nihilistic. 
Frankl is especially concerned with scrutinizing some of the underlying 
assumptions of Freudian psychoanalysis, which he says "is, and will remain 
forever, the indispensible foundation of every psychotherapy, including any 
22 
future schools." He does go on to say, "However, it will also have to share 
the fate of a foundation, that is to say, it will become invisible to the 
23 
extent to which the proper building is erected on it." 
Freud, in his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, expresses 
the view that psychoanalysis, in keeping with its scientific nature, has no 
Weitanschauung other than that of science itself. He gives to Weltanschauung 
a somewhat unusual and strongly Baconian definition, one which invites the 
negative assessment he goes on to give it. 
In my opinion then, a Weitanschauung is an intellectual 
construction which solves all the problems of our existence 
uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, 
accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which 
everything that interests us finds its fixed place. It will 
easily be understood that the possession of a Weitanschauung of 
' 
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this kind is among the ideal wishes of human beings. Believing 
in it one can feel secure in life, one can know what to strive 
for, and how one can deal most expediently with one's emotions 
and interests. 
These are the characteristics of a religion, according to Freud's understanding 
of religion, which would be challenged as incomplete by religious people of 
25 
many traditions. And religion is directly opposed by Freud to scientific 
thinking, with which he identifies psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, he says, 
is "not in a position to develop a Weitanschauung of its own" but "must 
accept the scientific one." The scientific one as he presents it is really 
more of an anti-Weitanschauung, again according to his definition of that 
concept. For in his view the ideals of science distinctively require that we 
renounce hope for "an intellectual construction that can solve all the 
problems of our existence...leaving no question unanswered"; in exchange 
we gain the more modest satisfactions of the patient and sober search for 
truth. 
But the Weltanschauung of science already departs noticeably 
from our definition. It is true that it too assumes the 
uniformity of the explanation of the universe; but it does so 
only as a programme the fulfillment of which is relegated to the 
future. Apart from this it is marked by negative characteristics, 
by its limitation to what is at the moment knowable and by its 
sharp rejection of certain elements that are alien to it. It 
asserts that there are no sources of knowledge of the universe 
other than the intellectual working-over of carefully scrutinized 
observations--in other words, what we call research--and of it?7 
no knowledge derived from revelation, intuition or divination. 
In considering Frankl's countering claim that philosophical assumptions 
are present in psychoanalysis along with all other psychological theories, we 
must examine what Frank! means by philosophy. He is really discussing philosophy 
in two different though related senses, one concerned with underlying concepts 




The first sense of philosophy as he uses it is that of "philosophy of 
life," as in the first quotation from him above, where the word is used more 
or less interchangeably with "concept of man." This is philosophy as a 
content; it will be contrasted later with philosophy in Frankl's second sense 
where it is considered as process. Much of Frankl's work is a sustained 
criticism of modern psychology for failing to do justice to what he calls 
"the humanness of man." 
The human quality of a human being is disregarded and neglected, 
for example, by those psychologists who adhere to either "the 
machine model" or "the rat model," as Gordon W. All port termed 
them. As to the first, I deem it a remarkable fact that man, 
as long as he regarded himself as a creature, interpreted his 
existence in the image of God, his creator: but as soon as he 
started considering himself as a creator, he began to interpret 
his existence merely in the image of his own creation, the 
machine. 
Frankl proposes a conceptual scheme, referred to as "dimensional 
ontology," according to which it should be recognized that the physical 
level and the psychodynamic level of human functioning, while their importance 
is not disputed, are contained in a more inclusive "noetic" or "spiritual" 
level. He makes it clear that in using the word "spiritual," he is still 
remaining in the realm of purely human phenomena: 
Logotherapy simply states: man is searching. But it can never 
decide if he is searching for a God he has invented, for a Gotf 
he has discovered, for a God he cannot find, or for himself. 
The noetic level is where authentic, irreducible concerns with artistic, 
intellectual, moral and religious aspects of life are found. According to 
Frankl's dimensional ontology, biological and psychodynamic conceptions are 
related to the whole human being as two-dimensional shadows would be to a 
three-dimensional object. He invokes the image of a cylinder which casts a 
round shadow when illuminated from one direction and a rectangular shadow 





resolved by recognizing how they are related as partial truths. Each is, in 
a sense, right in what it asserts and wrong in what it denies. As Frank! says, 
in what I think is one of the most illuminating of all his comments on 
the concepts of man he considers incomplete. 
But does the danger really lie in the lack of universality? 
Doesn't it rather lurk in the pretense of totality? What is 
dangerous is the attempt of a man who is an expert, say, in the 
field of biology, to understand and explain human beings 
exclusively in terms of biology. At the moment at which totality 
is claimed, biology becomes biologism, psychology becomes 
psychologism, and sociology becomes sociologism. In other 
words, at that moment science is turned into ideology. What we 
have to deplore, I would say, is not that scientists a^g 
specializing but that the specialists are generalizing. 
Dimensional ontology is anti-reductionistic. It is opposed to the 
notion that events at any of these levels are "nothing but" epiphenomena, 
causally determined by events at another level. As Frankl says, his theory 
acknowledges limited determinism--that is, it must take account of the fact 
that a person lives within some biological, psychological and social 
conditions that he/she may not be able to change. What he maintains is that 
even in the most extreme of limiting circumstances one is free to choose one's 
attitude toward these circumstances. He calls this capacity "the defiant 
power of the spirit." He rejects the "pan-determinism"--which philosophers 
discussing the question of free will have traditionally referred to simply as 
determinism-r-of reductionist thinking; he does not, however, deny the reality 
of inner and outer constraints, or the many times when events at one level do 
determine those at another. 
Frankl's conviction that one is always free to choose one's attitude even 
in the most hopeless of circumstances was strengthened by his experiences and 
observations as a Jew in the German concentration camps during World War II. 
In those settings he and his companions were indeed faced with the extreme of 




situation might be expected to overwhelm individual differences, leaving 
no latitude for choosing how one will respond to circumstances. "However," 
Frank! says, "the reverse was true. The beast was unmasked--and so was the 
saint. 
If I still had any need of proof that this defiant power of the 
spirit is a reality, then the concentration camp was the 
crucial experiment. Freud asserts, "Let one attempt to expose 
a number of the most diverse people uniformly to hunger. With 
the increase of the imperative urge of hunger all individual 
differences will blur, and in their stead will appear the 
uniform expression of the one unstilled urge." But this simply 
was not so. 
It was in the concentration camps that Frank! also experienced how a sense 
having 
of meaning in/something to survive for, whether a person, an unfinished work 
or a religious or moral ideal, often meant the difference between life and 
death. His therapeutic work both in that situation and later was directed 
toward helping people discover what it was they felt was worth living for. 
To a large extent the kinds of reasons Frankl offers for preferring 
his concept of man, with its emphasis on the noetic, are valid only from 
within his own point of view. He claims that reductionism in psychology 
must be rejected because it is nihilistic and unhealthy; and more generally 
he asserts that a Weltanschauung can be judged "right" or "wrong" according 
to whether or not it is anti-reductioniStic: 
Thus the issue cannot be whether or not psychotherapy is based 
on a Weltanschauung but rather, whether the Weitanschauung 
underlying it is right or wrong. Right or wrong, however, in 
this context means whether or not the humanness of man is 
preserved in a given philosophy and theory. 
This claim must be regarded as tendentious, for it is only according to 
Frankl's own view that the humanness of man is not preserved in the views 
he calls psychologism or biologism. He is offering a criterion for 
considering a concept of man to be "right" that applies to his own view, 
in preference to others, by definition. Frankl's dimensional ontology 
'■ 
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provides valuable aid in explicating his views on how the theories he 
considers reductionist are related to his own; but it supplies no argument 
or proof that the theories are reductionists in an unacceptable sense. From 
Frankl's point of view they are; from the point of view of their adherents 
they have genuinely succeeded in assimilating one class of phenomena into 
another, with a resulting gain in explanatory power. 
Frankl would be helped here by Agassi's distinction between two kinds 
of reductionists theories: those that attempt to explain one class of 
phenomena in terms of another (the classic example is the reduction of 
chemistry to physics) and those that explain away a whole class of phenomena. 
Efforts of the first kind, he believes, must be judged individually by their 
results; whereas efforts of the second kind can never be of any real interest 
to people with a serious concern with the things they purport to explain 
away. He illustrates the difference by presenting two ways of asserting 
the thesis that "man is a machine," according to the two approaches. 
The version which explains away distinctively human phenomena such as 
self-consciousness and moral life by equating humans with machines holds that 
humans can only do what (other) machines are observed to do. In other 
words, the theory holds not only that humans are machines but that they are 
just like other machines. It is explaining away such as this that most 
people, including Frankl, attack when they attack reductionism. But the 
second—explanatory—kind of reductionism would put the man-as-machine 
thesis differently: "Perhaps a machine can have self-consciousness and a 
moral life." As Agassi puts it, 
...we do observe that men are thinking and suffering beings, 
even though we still do not know whether they are or can be 
machines. For, if one day we conclude that morality can never 
apply to machines then we shall be able to conclude that men 
cannot be machines--and conversely. All traditional philosophical 
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anthropology, I contend, with the sole exception of that of 
Kant, overlooked this point to some extent or another. This, 
rather obvious, point of scientific methodology seems to be at 
the root of the discussion. It is unsatisfactory to explain 
away the observed specific human qualities: Perhaps man is a 
machine, but if so then he is a machine of a very special 
kind, a thinking and suffering machine, and hence a moral 
machine. If such a machine is not possible, then, obviously 
man is not a machine. One way or another, we cannot.overlook 
or explain away man's observed moral peculiarities. 
Agassi further emphasizes that many times a program for explanation is 
presented as if it were already an explanation. He holds that theories of 
man as machine or man as animal (to which exactly parallel arguments apply) 
are actually such programs for explanation, and that much confusion has 
been generated by discussing them without recognizing this. 
As applied to Freud, the question of which of these two sorts of 
reduction!'sm his theories involve is, at the very least, more complicated 
than Frank!'s criticisms would suggest. Frankl speaks as though Freud's 
reductionism clearly involved the intention of explaining away noetic 
concerns. Frankl quotes a passage from a letter of Freud to Binswanger 
which is a favorite among critics of Freud who feel that he neglected the 
non-instinctual aspects of human existence: "I have always confined myself 
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to the ground floor and basement of the edifice." Frankl feels this 
statement shows Freud laudably aware that his theories do justice only to 
some aspects of human beings—that it leaves room, in effect, for dimensional 
ontology. But he considers Freud to fall back into reductionism in the 
continuation of the quoted passage: 
—You maintain that by changing one's point of view, one can also 
see an upper story, in which dwell such distinguished guests as 
religion, art, etc. You are not the only one to say this; most 
cultured specimens of homo natura think the same thing. In this 
you are conservative, and I revolutionary. If I still had a 
lifetime of work ahead of me, I would be confident of my ability 
to make room in my humble little house for those lofty things. 
I have already found a place for religion, by putting it under 




speaking at cross purposes^ and our differences will be ironed 
out only after centuries. 
It is problematic to press a metaphor such as this too far. It does 
sound as though Freud is outlining a program for reductionistic explanation 
("to make room in my humble little house for those lofty things"), not for 
explaining away. It is on the basis of the limitations of Freud's conception 
of religion, rather than on a generalized charge of reductionism, that 
critics such as Frankl might argue that Freud is involved in explaining 
away. That is, what Freud has explained or is trying to explain is, in any 
case, not what they understand by religion. To the extent that Freud may 
have failed to do justice to many aspects of religious life, he could justly 
be seen as explaining them away, or perhaps just as ignoring them. Frankl 
says that in calling religion "the neurosis of mankind" Freud is reductionistic. 
Following Agassi we can see that it might be reductionistic in either of the 
two ways: in theory it could as well be taken to expand the notion of neurosis 
as to reduce that of religion. 
Frankl himself comes close to this position in discussing the 
inevitability of partial perspectives and different levels of explanation in 
science. In this connection he realizes that the type of reductionism he 
rejects is not a characteristic of a method as such, but of a mistaken 
understanding of the method. This leads to a discussion of the second of the 
two senses of philosophy in Frankl's work. Philosophy in this sense does 
not refer to any set of substantive views, ideals or values, Rather, it 
designates the process of scrutinizing one's ideas for the presence and 
influence of unrecognized assumptions and of remembering to take account 
of those assumptions critically. I think the heart of Frankl's work in 
bringing philosophy into psychology is in his turning attention to this 
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activity: "We must make explicit the implicit concept of man in 
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psychotherapy." 
Speaking in this vein, Frankl argues that avoiding reductionism is 
not a matter of choosing one theory or concept of man over another and 
then being committed to viewing it as the only correct one (though at 
times Frankl himself falls into this error). Rather, avoiding reductionism 
is a matter of consciousness; it is a matter of being aware of the inevitable 
bias and incompleteness introduced into one's thinking by the nature of 
the intellectual tools employed. The fault, that is, is not in the tools, 
but in ourselves insofar as we fail to remain or become conscious of their 
1imitations. 
In discussing the question of whether regarding Joan of Arc as a 
schizophrenic is incompatible with regarding her as a saint, Frankl says, 
A psychiatrist should confine himself to the dimension of 
psychiatry rather than conclude from a psychiatric phenomenon 
whether it is nothing but, or more than a psychiatric phenomenon. 
Confining himself to the dimension of psychiatry, however, 
implies projecting a given phenomenon into the dimension of 
psychiatry. This is perfectly 1egitimate as long as the 
psychiatrist is aware of what he does. Even more, projections 
are not only legitimate but also obligatory in science. Science 
cannot cope with reality in its multi dimensionality but must 
deal with reality as if reality were unidimensional. However, 
a scientist should remain aware of what he does, if for ng 
other reason than to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism. 
(my underlining) 
If our methodological approach involves systematically ignoring some of 
the qualities of the phenomena, as, for example, Newtonian mechanics involved 
ignoring so-called "secondary" characterisecssuch as color, this must be 
remembered; otherwise it might seem that the resulting theory proved the 
unimportance or non-existence of what it had left out. As applied to 
psychology, Frankl argues that the psychodynamic approach has systematically 




misleading depends on whether appropriate attention has been given to the 
fact that it is a simplification. 
Yet, if this does not occur with a full consciousness that a 
specific methodological approach has been chosen, then it can 
completely lead us astray. Above all, we must bear in mind 
all that we have thereby filtered out; for, in an exclusively 
psychodynamic approach, certain human phenomena will entirely 
escape us. We need to think here only of things like meaning 
and value; they must disappear from our field of vision as 
soon as we consider instincts and dynamics as the only valid 
criteria, and indeed thev^must for the simple reason that values 
do not drive--they pull. 
Frank! actually considers Freud's thought, in all its complexity, 
development and change over time, only in a cursory fashion. He quotes 
occasional remarks of Freud, but no major texts, nor does he seem 
particularly interested in the train of reasoning that led Freud to 
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undertake his explanatory program. In part Frankl could be said to 
belong to the class of critics mentioned by Freud as simply rejecting his 
conclusions because they seem too unpleasant. Frankl, in defending his 
own world-view, often quotes the saying of Goethe: 
If we take people as they are, we make them worse. If we 
treat them as if they were what they ought to be, we help 
them become what they are capable of becoming. 
He calls this "the finest maxim for any kind of psychotherapy." In effect 
his objection to the views he attributes to Freud, as well as to other views 
that he considers nihilistic, is not so much that they are false as that they 
might become true. Freud too was aware of the potential impact for good or 
ill of a conception of human nature, but he felt that damage is done, on the 
contrary, by a conception that is too rosy: 
Unfortunately what history tells us and what we ourselves have 
experienced does not speak in this sense [that "man is naturally 
good or at least good-natured"] but rather justifies a judgment 
that belief in the 'goodness' of human nature is one of those evil 
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illusions by which mankind expect their lives to be beauj^fied 
and made easier while in reality they only cause damage. 
Of course, it is not necessary to deny that both these dangers exist. 
On the level of method, Frankl criticizes Freud for being anti- 
philosophical, and for representing science in general and the "science" 
of psychoanalysis in particular in a naive empiricist way. Thus he is making 
two different kinds of objections. The first is to the specific content of 
a conception of human nature that he attributes, with some oversimplification, 
to Freud. The second is to the failure of Freud and others to recognize the 
presence of a shaping concept of human nature in their work and to make 
that concept explicit. 
There is, however, a connection. The same philosophical bias is 
involved in Freud's minimizing the extent to which he was choosing 
regulating metaphysical conceptions in his own intellectual endeavor, and in 
his minimizing the importance of choices of this kind (assigned by Frankl to 
the category "noological") in the lives of people. Putting it epigrammatically 
it could be said that in Freud's work we see Baconian empiricist assumptions 
about the nature of science revealing their logical implications for the 
realm of psychology. The implication for the content of his theories is in 
minimizing noological issues; the implications for methodology are in 





HI FRANKL'S CRITIQUE OF THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE AND THE NOTION OF 
HOMEOSTASIS IN MOTIVATION THEORY 
Frank!'s criticisms of the pleasure principle, or, as he calls it, 
the "wil1-to-pleasure," as providing an inadequate account of human 
motivation rely on several different types and levels of argument. He 
contends that the search for pleasure is self-defeating; that it is 
characteristic not of healthy functioning but only of the neurotic; and 
that as part of a homeostasis theory it denies any real involvement with 
anything outside the self except as a means to produce for the self 
certain desired mental or physical states. It is the last of these to which 
he gives by far the most importance, and in which the philosophical issues 
that connect him with the eighteenth century moralists are directly raised. 
Once again, the application to Freud's thought is quite general. 
Frankl addresses his arguments to views he considers widely prevalent and 
particularly characteristic of Freudian psychoanalysis. These views 
involve postulating a "will to pleasure" that directly or indirectly 
determines all actions. "Pleasure" is sometimes spoken of in his discussion 
as a positive good, and sometimes simply as the cessation of pain, that is, 
relief of tension caused by unfulfilled needs. Whether, when, and in what 
form, and especially for what reasons Freud actually held the particular 
views that Frankl criticizes are questions Frankl does not explore. Nor 
does he address the extensive modifications of the instinct theory by 
later psychoanalytic theorists such as Hartmann and Erikson.^ 
While Frankl does not address Freud's own formulations of the 
pleasure principle directly, it is useful to bear in mind a few of these 
formulations in considering Frankl's discussion. According to Freud, the 
instincts or drives seek the removal of stimulation, which is postulated 
' 
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by him to be unpleasant. 
An instinct, then, is distinguished from a stimulus by the 
fact that it arises from sources of stimulation within the 
body, that it operates as a constant force and that the 
subject cannot avoid it by flight, as is possible with an 
external stimulus. Its source is a state of excitation in 
the body, its aim is the removal of that excitation; on its 
path from its source to its aim the instinct becomes operative 
psychically. We picture it as a certain quota of energy which 
presses in a particular direction. It is from this pressing 
that it derives its name of "Trieb." 
The term "economic" emphasizes the lack of qualitative distinction between 
these "quota of energy." 
The id of course knows no judgments of value: no good and evil, 
no morality. The economic, or, if you prefer, the 
quantitative factor, which is intimately linked to the pleasure 
principle, dominates all its processes. Instinctual cathexes ^ 
seeking discharge--that, in our view, is all there is in the id. 
Freud describes the pleasure principle, in his General Introduction 
to Psycho-Analysis, as follows, with the warning that these considerations 
belong to "one of the most important, but unfortunately one of the most 
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obscure, territories of psycho-analysis": 
We may put the question whether a main purpose is discernible 
in the operation of the mental apparatus; and our first approach 
to an answer is that this purpose is directed to the attainment 
of pleasure. It seems that our entire psychical activity is bent 
upon procuring pieasure and avoiding pain, that it is 
automatically regulated by the PLEASURE-PRINCIPLE. Now 
of all things in the world we should like to know what are 
the conditions giving rise to pleasure and pain, but that is 
just where we fall short. We may only venture to say that 
pleasure is in some way connected with lessening, lowering, 
or extinguishing the amount of stimulation present in the mental 
apparatus; and that pain involves a heightening of the latter. 
He also indicates that the pleasure principle can be seen as part of a more 
general effort to maintain homeostasis, or the lowest possible level of 
stimulation: 
It appears that we can describe the tasks and performances of 
the mental apparatus in another way and more generally than 
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by emphasizing the attainment of pleasure. We can say that 
the mental apparatus serves the purpose of mastering and 
dischargin^gthe masses of supervening stimuli, the quantities 
of energy. 
Though Freud says "the transition from the pleasure-principle to the 
reality-principle is one of the most important advances in the development 
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of the ego," the reality principle does not have different goals but 
only different methods. It is only a "modification" of the pleasure 
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principle under the influence of necessity. The pleasure sought by 
the reality principle is delayed and diminished, and in exchange for this 
putatively more secure, but it is not different in kind. "The ego is after 
all only a portion of the id, a portion that has been expediently modified 
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by the proximity of the external world with its threat of danger." 
Only at one stage did Freud consider the pleasure principle to be 
the sole determinant of psychic life. Later, as in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principie, he adduced phenomena such as repetition compulsion for which he 
felt the pleasure principle could not adequately account. He also introduced 
in that work complex speculations about different types of instincts, life 
instincts and death instincts, of which only the death instincts seemed 
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fully consistent with the pleasure principle. 
Yet it is only the earlier notions of pleasure as the universal goal 
that Frank! discusses. I think this is because it is that conception that he 
needs to modify in order to establish his own theories. His underlying concern 
is to establish the importance of meaning for peoples' lives--a very 
practical, 1ife-or-death importance in situations of extreme suffering such 
as Frankl experienced. And meaninq, for him, involves havinq qoals that 
are outside oneself. Denyinq that this is possible destroys meaninq on a 
grand scale. Hence Frankl's real target is the element in Freud's theories 
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that can be used, and has been used, to support such a conclusion. It is 
of relatively less importance to him that this element may have exerted its 
influence on subsequent developments in psychology, as well as on the 
popular culture, in a much less subtle form than it had in its original 
context. 
Frankl's first argument against the pleasure principle, as he has 
defined it, is that pleasure cannot be the fundamental goal of human 
activity because it can arise only as a by-product of pursuit of other 
goals, eluding direct pursuit. 
For didactic reasons the will to meaning has been counterposed 
by way of a heuristic oversimplification both to the pleasure 
principle, which is so pervasive in psychoanalytic motivational 
theories, and to the will to power, the concept which plays 
such a decisive role in Adlerian psychology. I do not weary 
of contending that the will to pleasure is really a self- 
defeating principle inasmuch as the more a man would actually 
set out to strive for pleasure the less he would gain it. 
This is due to the fundamental fact that pleasure is a by¬ 
product, or side effect, of the fulfillment of our strivings, 
but is destroyed and spoiled to the extent to which it is made 
a goal or target. 
Not only pleasure but also happiness, peace of mind, good conscience, 
"self-actualization" and good health are in Frankl's view by-products of 
dedication to purposes other than the attaining of these things themselves. 
"..'pursuit of happiness' amounts to a self-contradiction: the more we 
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strive for happiness, the less we attain it." The person who devotes 
his or her life to health is not healthy but hypochondriac; the person 
who wants to be morally justified is too self-absorbed to be genuinely 
moral. 
A man who is striving for a condition in which he can rightly 
say, "I possess a good conscience" would already represent a 
case of Pharisaism. A really good conscience can never be 
reached by grasping for it, but solely by doing a deed for 
the sake of a cause, or for the sake of the person involved, 
or for God's sake.0 
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Interpretation according to the pleasure principle could not do justice 
to the difference between these two cases. 
Frankl takes the self-contradictory nature of direct pursuit of 
pleasure to be evidence that pleasure is not what human beings ultimately 
pursue. 
This can be stated in a simple formula: The aims of both 
the hedonistic philosophy of the Epicureans and the quietistic 
philosophy of the Stoics, i.e., happiness and peace of mind 
(or, as the latter was called by the ancient Greeks, ataraxia), 
cannot possibly be the real aim of human behavior, and they 
cannot for the a priori reason that they elude man exactly to 
the same degree that he strives for them. 
Yet there is nothing impossible in the notion of human striving as inherently 
self-contradictory and doomed to frustration. According to such a—tragic- 
vision, pleasure or happiness might be an unattainable, even paradoxical, aim, 
and still a real one. 
As his second argument, Frankl points out that there are instances 
where pleasure does serve as a "real" aim of human behavior; these are in 
cases of neurosis. On this view the pleasure principle is flawed in that 
it unjustifiably assimilates all striving to neurotic striving. It is 
indeed from knowledge of cases such as the examples he refers to of 
sexual dysfunction, that he observes "the self-thwarting quality of 
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pleasure intention." Furthermore, this is the basis for his therapeutic 
techniques of "dereflection" and "paradoxical intention," in which a patient 
is invited to extricate him- or herself from this self-defeating striving 
by deliberately redirecting effort. 
In the face of what he considers an ever more widespread loss of sense 
of meaning—the "existential vacuum"—Frankl observes that many people are 
living for the sake of pleasure or power in some form. If he bases his 
objection to this on the observation that such lives are rarely happy, 
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he has come full circle in his argument. He could be considered to be 
proposing not an abandonment but an improvement of the striving for pleasure, 
according to the following observation: if you want to pursue pleasure 
intelligently (successfully), you must pursue it indirectly. 
These first two points, whatever their merits as psychological 
insights, really miss the fundamental nature of Freud's hypothesis. For 
in these two arguments Frankl is talking about happiness and pleasure in 
the everyday sense, the sense which would allow them to be contrasted 
meaningfully with other goals, such as fame, power, artistic or intellectual 
accomplishment, moral perfection, wisdom. It may well be that the choice 
of happiness, from among these and other possibilities, is paradoxical in 
that it defeats itself. But the claim of the pleasure principle is a much 
more radical one: it claims that from the point of view of motivation all 
these choices are the same. They are all made in pursuit of pleasure, 
differing only in the degree to which the satisfaction must be obtained 
indirectly or incompletely, due to repression. 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud specifically addresses the 
question of an "instinct toward perfection" in human beings, finding this 
to be an illusion: 
The present development of human beings requires, as it seems to 
me, no different explanation from that of animals. What appears 
in a minority of human individuals as an untiring impulsion 
towards further perfection can easily be understood as a result 
of the instinctual repression upon which is based all that is 
most precious in human civilization. The repressed instinct 
never ceases to strive for complete satisfaction, which would 
consist in the repetition of a primary experience of satisfaction 
The pleasure principle, that is to say, makes claims about the nature of 
any striving, whether it be for happiness or something else. Narrowing the 
focus to striving that is explicitly aimed at achieving pleasure or 




Frank!’s third and central line of arguments against the pleasure 
principle does move away from these questions about where direct striving 
for pleasure can be observed and whether it works as a practical matter, and 
takes up the central issues about how striving of any kind is to be understood. 
Here his criticism of the pleasure principle is explicitly embedded in 
criticism of the underlying notion of motivation as aimed, as Freud suggested, 
at restoring or maintaining homeostasis. On such a view, Frank! quotes 
Allport as saying, "motivation is regarded as a state of tenseness that leads 
us to seek equilibrium, rest, adjustment, satisfaction, or homeostasis. From 
this point of view personality is nothing more than our habitual modes of 
fin 
reducing tension." Frankl's objection is that this denies the individual's 
relation to the world: 
From such a perspective, man is considered in what I call a 
monadologistic way, and his tie with the world in which he 
exists is disregarded. 
In a monadologistic view of man there is no place for any 
true encounter between man on the one hand and the world and 
its objects on the other. The objects in the world are no longer 
seen in their objective essence but, instead, only as more or 
less useful tools for the maintenance of homeostasis. There 
is no room left for anything such as commitment to a cause 
for its own sake or participation with a partner for the 
partner's sake. Instead, causes and partners are devaluated 
to the level of mere means to an end--the end of restoring 
certain conditions in the subject's psychic system. As means, 
they appear to the subject.to have no value in themselves but 
to be only of use to him. 
Arguing along somewhat Kantian lines, Frank! draws the further conclusion 
that where other people only figure as means to an end, rather than as 
ends in themselves, there is no real morality. 
In the framework of the psychodynamic interpretation of 
conscience, man strives for moral behavior only for the sake of 
getting rid of the stimulus of a bad conscience or, to stick 
to psychodynamic terminology, the stimulus of a discontented 
superego. Obviously, such a view of man's moral behavior 
misses the point of true morality, which begins only when man 
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has begun to act for the sake of something or someone, but 
not for his own sake, that is, for the sake?of having a good 
conscience or of getting rid of a bad one. 
Again, he is not claiming that maintenance of homeostasis and reduction 
of tension cannot be regulating goals, but only that this represents a 
pathological state, and should not be accepted as defining the whole 
possible spectrum of experience: 
As a finite being, man never perfectly completes his life 
task. When he is willing and able to shoulder the burden of 
this incompleteness, he is acknowledging this finiteness. This 
acceptance of finiteness is the precondition to mental health 
and human progress, while the inability to accept it is 
characteristic of the neurotic personality. Thus the 
homeostasis principle, of which we spoke previously, is by 
no means a normal phenomenon but rather a neurotic one. It 
is the neurotic individual who cannot abide the normal tension 
of life—whether physical, psychic, or moral. 0 
Criticism of theories of motivation based on drives and homeostasis 
has been widespread in the field of animal behavior, as well as in many 
schools of human psychology including psychoanalysis. Frankl is in a large 
and varied company in raising his objections. The psychologist Robert 
White described in a review article in 1959 the emergence of deepening 
discontent with theories of motivation of this kind both in animal behavior 
studies and in psychoanalytic ego psycho!ogy.^ White refers in particular 
to a considerable amount of evidence that is difficult to reconcile with 
classical drive theories, such as reports of observations that both animals 
and humans seem motivated to learn and to develop competence for its own 
sake, in experimental situations where their major instinctual needs have 
all been satisfied, and the competence is not required to maintain that 
state. Of course, in the face of any amount of evidence, one could decide 
to speak of a new drive, e.g., a drive for competence, or even for excitement 






"the motivation needed to attain competence cannot be wholly derived from 
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sources of energy currently conceptualized as drives or instincts." Does 
it matter whether the drive theory is abandoned or exapnded to include ever 
less straightforwardly biological needs? 
From Agassi's point of view it probably does not matter, providing 
that retaining the term "drive" does not subtly tend toward assimilating the 
newly recognized motives to others--especially those relating to reproduction 
and survival--more traditionally emphasized. To Frank!, on the other hand, 
it matters a great deal. He takes some pains to emphasize that the will 
to meaning that he describes should not be viewed as another drive. For 
on Frankl's view "drive" inherently implies striving toward homeostasis, and 
striving toward homeostasis locates the ultimate goal of all action in states 
of oneself: 
The reality principle is, according to Freud's own words, a 
mere extension of the pleasure principle; one which serves 
the pleasure principle's purpose. One could just as well say 
that the pleasure principle itself is a mere extension working 
in the service cf a wider concept called the homeostasis 
principle and serves its purposes. Ultimately, the psycho¬ 
dynamic concept of man presents him as a being basically 
concerned with maintaining or restoring his inner equilibrium, 
and in order to do so, he is trying to gratify his drives and 
satisfy his instincts....What has been sacrificed, however, and 
hence totally eliminated in this view of man, is the fundamental 
fact which lends itself to a phenomenological analysis--namely, 
that man is a being encountering other beings and reaching out 
for meanings to fulfill. 
And this is precisely the reason why I speak of a will to 
meaning rather than a need for meaning or a drive to meaning. 
If man were really driven to meaning he would embark on meaning 
fulfillment solely for the sake of getting rid of this drive, 
in order to restore homeostasis within himself. At the same 
time, however, he would no longer be really concerned with 
meaning itself but rather with his owa equi1ibriurn and thus, 
in the final analysis, with himself. (my underlining) 
Whether the will to meaning is construed as a drive or not, problems 




this term. Donald Tweedie has pointed out, in a perceptive discussion of 
Frankl's paper "The Philosophical Foundations of Logotherapy," where many of 
Frankl's views on this subject are developed, that if Frank! is to be 
consistent in his own argument, "meaning" really cannot be considered a 
goal in itself either. "I think that...'meaning1 per jse serves no better 
as an end in itself (suffering the fate of all 'bloodless categories') than 
does 'pleasure' or 'power' or 'self-actualization.'"^ The "didactic reasons" 
which Frankl says are responsible for what he avows is an oversimplification, 
lead him to obscure somewhat his own point. Meaning too is a by-product. 
I think that in Frankl's terms doing something for its own sake and doing it 
for the sake of "meaning" are the same; yet the second of these ways of 
speaking introduces a confusing parallel to the other theories that Frankl 
is criticizing. The confusion may go deeper than awkward semantics; this 
is hard to say. 
What Frankl is rejecting with this third and broadest argument against 
the pleasure principle is the theory known, in moral philosophy, as philosophical 
egoism. In effect his third argument is, "if we accept the pleasure principle, 
we accept philosophical egoism." This is an important connection to make. 
But, obviously, it works as an argument only to the extent that good arguments 
against philosophical egoism itself are available. These are not supplied 
by Frankl; he tends to treat the theory as self-evidently objectionable, 
as if the discovery that it is implied in the pleasure principle were almost 
e reductio ad absurdum of that principle. However, in the context of 
eighteenth century moral philosophy the theory of philosophical egoism was 
extensively debated. In that context we can find helpful elucidations of 
some confusions that tend to support the theory, though no absolutely 
definitive arguments against it. 
. 
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IV. FRANKL'S VIEWS IN THE CONTEXT OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY: BUTLER AND 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DEBATE OVER PHILOSOPHICAL EGOISM 
The issues Frankl raises against Freud's pleasure principle can be 
seen to echo many earlier discussions in moral philosophy. Frankl's 
position ultimately rests on rejecting the notion that human motivation 
in all its apparent diversity can be reduced to a concern with maintaining 
homeostasis, and hence, to a concern with oneself. His discussion is 
centered around Freud's pleasure principle, but it is really the underlying 
issue of whether it is possible to have motives that go beyond this kind 
i s 
of self-concern that he most interested in. Views much like the one he 
is questioning can also be found in ancient philosophy, among, for example, 
the Greek Sophists, the Chinese Legalists and the Roman Epicureans, and 
more recently in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Bernard Mandeville, and 
CO 
some of the nineteenth century utilitarians. The view developed by all 
these writers has been referred to as "philosophical egoism" and it is 
really the debate about philosophical egoism that Frankl has joined. 
Accordingly, there is also a long history of criticism of egoist views 
along lines somewhat similar to Frankl's. Indeed it seems that the whole 
spectrum of views on this subject has been developed repeatedly, suggesting 
that perhaps the egoist and anti-egoist views all represent valid aspects 
of experience which their respective adherents have chosen to stress. 
In the moral philosophy of the eighteenth century in England, in 
particular, these issues were canvassed with great thoroughness. The moral 
philosopher and theologian Joseph Butler, Bishop of Durham (1692-1752) 
developed powerful arguments against the version of philosophical egoism 
represented by Hobbes and Mandeville in his time. He is considered by many 




thesis that there is no such thing as disinterested action. 
Butler's arguments are of a logical and conceptual kind: we might ask 
how such arguments can be relevant to questions that have now been assigned 
to the domain of the scientific specialty of psychology, with its basis 
in clinical experience and experiment. Freud said, in the General Introduction 
to Psycho-Analysis, 
...you are not for a moment to suppose that the psycho¬ 
analytic point of view which I shall lay before you is a 
speculative system of ideas. On the contrary, it is the 
result of experience, being founded either on direct 
observations or on conclusions drawn from observation. 
Whether these have been drawn in an adequate or a justifiable 
manner future advances in science will show....it was 
particularly difficult, intense, and all-absorbing work that 
yielded these observations. I have often had the impression 
that our opponents were unwilling to consider this source of 
our statements, as if they looked upon them as ideas derived gg 
subjectively which anyone could dispute at his own sweet will. 
But in this passage Freud is speaking very much as a Baconian inductivist, 
as discussed above, for whom the only alternatives are that a point of 
view be "founded on direct observations or on conclusions drawn from 
observation" or else "derived subjectively which anyone could dispute at 
his own sweet will."^ At other times Freud was less inclined to minimize 
the complexity of the process by which conclusions are drawn from 
observation, as when he said later in the New Introductory Lectures, 
The theory of instincts is so to say our mythology. Instincts 
are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness. 
In our work we cannot for a moment disregard.them, yet we are 
never sure that we are seeing them clearly. 
A preliminary answer to the question of how the work of Butler and 
other eighteenth century moral philosophers could be relevant to a dispute 
among modern psychological theorists is that the dispute centrally involves 
philosophical issues, in particular issues about how certain concepts are 




"Egoism and Altruism" has characterized the way in which he thinks 
philosophical method and knowledge of the philosophical background are 
applicable to current psychological discussions on the theory of human 
motivation. He refers in particular to certain Freudian notions as 
belonging to "conceptual schemes which have already been encountered in 
philosophy." His discussion is worth quoting at some length, as it creates 
the background for the arguments in the rest of this section: 
The philosophers from Hobbes to Sidgwick who analyze the concepts 
of egoism, altruism, and sympathy often write as if they were 
empirical students of human nature, disputing the facts of 
human action and motivation. But it is more illuminating to 
read them as offering conceptual accounts of what it is to 
have a good reason for action and of what the limits upon the 
range of possible good reasons are. But so closely allied are 
conceptual and empirical issues at this point in the argument 
that it is not surprising to find that the would-be empirical 
accounts which psychologists claim to have derived from 
observation should sometimes turn out to be a rendering of 
conceptual schemes which have already been encountered in 
philosophy. So it is with Freud, most strikingly in his earlier 
writings. The important place in Freudian theory held by the 
pleasure principle, the concepts of gratification and libido, 
and the consequent view of socialization all lead to a theory 
in which the gratification of the self is primary and in which 
altruism and benevolence are interpreted as secondary phenomena 
which acquire the reagrd that they do because they are originally 
associated with forms of self-gratification_There is, therefore, 
not only the task of clarifying the concepts involved in these 
accounts, but also the task of settling how far the issues 
raised are genuinely empirical and how far genuinely 
conceptual. The concepts in need of clarification are of five 
kinds: the nature of desire; self-interest; altruism and 
benevolence; motives, actions, and sympathies; and the 
genetic fallacy. 
Clarification of these concepts is what moral philosophy is largely 
about, as philosophy of science is largely about "whether scientific ideas 
do emerge from the facts." Since it is philosophical egoism that Frankl 
is most centrally attacking, consideration of Butler's similar response 




issues involved. In particular it will help to reveal some underlying 
views of ours--inherited perhaps from eighteenth and nineteenth century 
moral thought—that may play a part in maintaining the plausibility of 
certain fallacious arguments by which philosophical egoism seems to be 
supported. 
The doctrine of philosophical egoism also sometimes called psychologi 
egoism is remarkably difficult to define. It can be held for many reasons, 
based on many different kinds of arguments, and small differences in the 
formulation of it may lead discussion down many different paths. One 
modern formulation of the doctrine, by the moral philosopher Bernard 
Harrison, is as follows: 
Egoism is the doctrine that all men are wholly selfish 
all the time; or that no man ever acts save for the sake of 
some future state of his own (mental or physical) person. 
Philosophical egoism must be recognized as a descriptive theory of human 
motivation. It purports to tell us what the range is of possible kinds of 
motivation for human beings; it tells us, in contrast to some competing 
theories, that this range is quite narrow. The doctrine is not only 
distinct from but logically incompatible with certain prescriptive egoistic 
views that hold that people ought always to act in such a way as to 
maximize their own pleasure or advantage. According to philosophical 
egoism this is the only way people ever act; there is no need to exhort 
them to it. 
This egoist principle is the principle Frankl is disputing, in 
rejecting homeostasis theories. He too is concerned most of all with 
whether a psychological theory holds that it is for the sake of things and 
people in the outer world or for the sake of states of his or her own being 

that a person acts. This is evident, for example, in the passage quoted 
above: 
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...If man were really driven to meaning...he would no longer 
be really concerned with meaning itself but rather with his 
own equilibrium and thus, in the final analysis, with himself. 
Philosophical egoism entered English moral philosophy with Hobbes 
and Mandeville in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hobbes had 
a profound influence on the work of the eighteenth century English moral 
philosophers, perhaps most on those whose effort was devoted to refuting 
him. The refutation evolved by Butler in his sermons on human nature is 
considered by many twentieth century philosophers to have been successful. 
However, they also tend to view the egoist philosophy as more influential 
in the eighteenth century than it is now, and thus more in need of refuting. 
In 1930 the English philosopher C. D. Broad noted the persistence of 
philosophical egoism, in spite of what he considered conclusive arguments 
brought by Butler against it. 
It was...fashionable in Butler's time to deny the possibility 
of disinterested action. This doctrine, which was a speculative 
principle with Hobbes, has always had a certain vogue. It is not 
without a certain superficial plausibility, and it has naturally 
been popular both with vicious persons who wanted a philosophical 
excuse for their own selfishness and with decent people who 
felt slightly ashamed of their own virtues and wished to be 
taken for men of the world. One of Butler's great merits is 
to have pointed out clearly and conclusively the ambiguities 
of language which make it plausible_In Butler's day the theory 
moved in higher social and intellectual circles, and it had 
to be treated more seriously than any philosopher would trouble 
to treat it now. This change is very largely the result of 
Butler's work; he killed the theory so thoroughly that he 
sometimes seems to the modern reader to be flogging dead horses. 
Still, all good fallacies go to America when they die, and rise 
again as the latest discoveries of the local professors. So it 
will always be useful to have Butler's refutation at hand. 
Broad may have thought that Butler killed the theory, but Butler's 
work is largely unknown outside circles of people with a specialized 
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interest in eighteenth century intellectual history; and to the extent that 
debate about human motivation has moved from philosophy to psychology, and 
even biology, the whole tradition of previous discussion is commonly 
disregarded. Furthermore, what Butler actually addressed himself to 
were certain assailable arguments for the theory, and these can in principle 
be replaced by others. Yet to the extent that those arguments still shape 
assumptions about the nature of motivation and action, Butler's discussion 
is indeed a valuable source to consult. 
Before turning to Butler's arguments, I will attempt to convey something 
of the general flavor of the egoistic theories of Mandeville and Hobbes with 
a few examples. Hobbes offered analyses of concepts such as pity and 
charity entirely in terms of concern for one's own safety or power: 
Pity is imagination of future calamity to our selves proceeding 
from the sense of another man's Calamity. But when it 
lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the 
compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more 
probability that the same may happen to us: for, the evil 
that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. 
But when we see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot 
easily think will fall upon our selves, the pity is the less. 
And therefore men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, 
whom they love, thevuthink worthy of good, and therefore not 
worthy of calamity.7 
There is yet another passion sometimes called Love, but more 
properly good will or Charity. There can be no greater 
argument, to a man, of his own power, then to find himself able 
not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist 
other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein 
consisteth Charity. In which, first, is contained that 
natural affection of Parents to their Children...as also, 
that affection wherewith men seek to assist those that adhere 
unto them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow 
their benefits on strangers, is not to be called Charity, but 7R 
either Contract, or Fear, which maketh them to purchase Peace. 
Even laughter, not exactly an example from the conventional repertoire 




I may therefore conclude, that the Passion of Laughter is nothing 
else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of 
some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity 
of others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies 
of themselves past, when they come suddenly7to remembrance, except 
they bring with them any present dishonour.' 
Mandeville is similarly involved in the wholesale debunking of 
conventional moral virtues, according to the unifying principle that pride 
is at the root of all of them. "The moral virtues are the political 
offspring which flattery begot upon pride." His major work. The Fab!e 
of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, is full of debunking 
analyses of the various particular moral virtues. But he also articulates 
a view whereby all actions, regardless of their specific nature, can be 
known to be selfish even without attributing them to a particular selfish 
passion such as pride or love of power. 
There is no merit in saving an innocent babe ready to drop 
into the fire; the action is neither good nor bad, and what 
benefit soever the infant received, we only obliged ourselves, 
for to have seen it fall, and not strove to hinder it, would 
have cauged a pain which self-preservation compelled us to 
prevent. 
...in the choice of things men must be determined by the perception 
they have of happiness; and...no person can commit or set 
about9an action which at the present time seems not best to 
him.82 
What all these examples have in common is that no evidence about 
any specific individual is required to support the egoist claim. Mandeville 
is talking about anyone who rescues a child from the fire; this is different 
from claiming to know enough about one particular incident to argue that, 
for example, the rescuer actually did not care about the child and acted 
only out of hope of reward or fear of recrimination. As Harrison points 
out, the universality of the egoist thesis suggests that there are some 






People, especially young people, often accept this [egoist] 
thesis with cheerful alacrity, as though it were an obvious 
truism, or a piece of robust common sense. This ought to 
astonish us, if we consider the incredible generality of the 
egoist's claim. Everyone, everywhere, all the time acts 
selfishly? How could one possibly know? What conceivable 
mode of empirical inquiry could establish a conclusion of such 
summary and magesterial universality? 
His answer to this question is that a logical proof of the position seems 
to be available, and occurs readily even on hearing the egoist thesis for 
the first time. His account of this proof is as follows: 
To say that somebody, _X, performed an action, a_, of his own 
free will is to say that it pleased him to do it. But to 
say that is to say that _X did a for the sake of the pleasure 
which it gave him to do a_. But the pleasure _X gets from doing 
a_ is, obviously, a state of _X's mind. It follows, therefore, 
that _X does nothing save for the sake of future mental states 
of his, or for the sake of future states of his body which 
happen to beogecessary to the maintenance of the mental states 
in question. 
Alasdair MacIntyre gives another reconstruction of this argument, in which 
the idea of motive and the idea of self-seeking motive are equated, on 
what are supposed to be purely logical grounds: 
How can any actual or possible object or state of affairs 
provide me with a motive, appear to me as good or desirable, 
unless it appears to be what will satisfy some desire of mine? 
If the (necessary and sufficient) condition of an object's 
providing me with a motive is that it satisfy some desire of 
mine, then it will surely be the case that all my actions will 
have as their goal the satisfaction of my desires. And to 
seek only to satisfy my own desires is surely to have an 
entirely self-seeking nature. 
Thus the universality of the theory is supported, behind the abundance 
of case-by-case efforts to give egoist accounts of conventional moral virtues, 
by the universality of an a priori argument. It is on this argument that 
the discussion really depends, for case-by-case argument is bound to be 





example. And, even more deeply problematic, it is exactly on the proper 
characterization of the examples that egoists and anti-egoists will disagree. 
If, for example, "pity" is analyzed according to Hobbes' definition, it 
will be impossible, no matter how many instances of pity one could produce, 
to produce one that an egoist would acknowledge as not representing fear 
for oneself rather than concern for the other. For what the anti-egoist 
adduces as a demonstration of pity, the Hobbesian is prepared to understand, 
by a priori principles, only in other terms. That examples of apparently 
generous, magnanimous, compassionate, courageous actions can be found is 
not contested from an egoist position; the egoist claim is that these actions 
are actually done for the sake of self. Multiplying such examples can do 
nothing but confirm each side in its opinion. Frankl 's appeal to the observed 
phenomena of moral life can be seen, in this light, as failing to appreciate 
the radical nature of the egoist position. The phenomena he adduces are in 
conflict with egoism only from Frankl's point of view. 
An a priori argument that seems to establish a substantive conclusion 
about human nature seems immediately suspicious. If it seems we can learn 
from mere scrutiny of the concept of motivation that all motives are selfish, 
it must be that we are scrutinizing a concept that already incorporates 
this conclusion. The argument amounts, that is, to fleshing out an egoist 
conception of "motive" which identifies it with "self-seeking motive," on 
the grounds that no one can be moved to action except by considerations of 
selfish advantage. But this is exactly what the egoist theory is supposed 
to prove. A persuasive and apparently logical sequence of ideas is 
functioning here only as reiteration, not as argument. 
The question hinges on what the implications are of saying that an 
action "satisfies some desire of mine," and even more important, on what 
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this does not mean. It was to these issues that Butler addressed the 
arguments in his sermons, recognizing that the tendency to accept an egoist 
concept of motive had a basis in some profound confusions evident in the 
language in which motivation was discussed. 
Butler responds to Hobbes' definitions of pity and charity on two 
levels. His disputes at length the particular plausibility of each of the 
two definitions; for example, he asks why, if charity is just love of power, 
we can rejoice in the good fortune of another even when we ourselves did 
not confer the benefit. 
Is there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that 
good to another, which he knows himself unable to procure him; 
and rejoicing in it, though bestowed by a third person? 
And can love of power any way possibly come in to account for 
this desire or delight?5 
And similarly he argues that if Hobbes' definition of pity were adequate, 
the most fearful men would be the most compassionate, and this is clearly 
contrary to observation. 
Thus fear and compassion would be the same idea, and a fearful 
and a compassionate man the same character, which every one 
immediately sees are totally different. 
But more powerful than any quarreling with the inadequacies of specific 
definitions is Butler's recognition that these analyses are offered in the 
service of a more general hypothesis, and that they owe to that hypothesis 
a greater measure of plausibility than they might otherwise seem to 
deserve. 
Cautious of being deceived with outward show, he [Hobbes] 
retires within himself to see exactly, what that is in the mind 
of man from whence this appearance proceeds; and, upon deep 
reflection, asserts the principle in the mind [of charity] to 
be only the love of power, and delight in the exercise of it. 
Would not everybody think here was a mistake of one word for 
another? that the philosopher was contemplating and accounting 
. 
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for some other human actions, some other behaviour of man to 
man?...And could any one be thoroughly satisfied, that what is 
commonly called benevolence or good-will was really the 
affection meant, but only by being made to understand that this 
learned person had at general hypothesis, to whj,gh the appearance 
of good-will could no otherwise be reconciled?^ (my underlining) 
It is to the general hypothesis rather than to specific examples that Butler 
directs most of his discussion. 
Butler's question for the egoist theorists is this: if actions are 
undertaken solely for the sake of the pleasure they will give us, and are 
apart from that of no intrinsic worth to the person performing them, from 
whence will the pleasure come? Why would it be pleasurable to have or 
accomplish something I do not actually care about at all? Of course some 
things can be desired as means to further ends. Butler's point is that if 
everything is viewed as a means to some further end, and nothing as an end 
in itself, the idea that we get pleasure at all out of these actions becomes 
incoherent. 
Yet nothing is more common than to hear it asked, what advantage 
a man hath in such a course, suppose of study, particular 
friendships, or in any other, nothing, I say, is more common 
than to hear such a question put in a way which supposes no 
gain, advantage, or interest, but as a means to somewhat further: 
and if so, then there is no such thing at all as real interest, 
gain, or advantage. This is the same absurdity with respect 
to life, as an infinite series of effects without a cause is 
in speculation. The gain, advantage, or interest, consists in the 
delight itself, arising from such a faculty's having its 
object: neither is there any such thinagas happiness or 
enjoyment, but what arises from hence. 
Frankl made a related criticism from the empirical point of view, observing 
that, in fact, direct pursuit of pleasure or happiness is self-defeating. 
Butler is aware of this as well ("Surely that character we call selfish 
is not the most promising for happiness." ) but he is also identifying a 





So if self-love wholly engrosses us and leaves no room for any 
other principle there can be absolutely no such thing at all 
as happiness, or enjoyment of any kind whatever, since happiness 
consists in the gratification o|,particular passions, which 
presupposes the having of them. 
By particular passions Butler means desires for particular goals other than 
pleasure or satisfaction itself. Sometimes he creates confusion by calling 
these "external" objects, but from other aspects of his argument as well 
as from examples such as that of a course of study, given in the quotation 
above, it seems fairly clear that what he means by "external" is "external 
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to self-interest as such." 
Besides, the very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily 
presupposes particular passions or appetites; since the very 
idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an 
appetite or affection enjoys its object. It is not because we 
love ourselves that we find delight in such and such objects, 
but because we have particular affections towards them. Take 
away these affections and you leave self-love absolutely nothing 
at all to employ itself about; no end or object for it to 
pursue, except only that of avoiding pain. 
This last phrase, "except only that of avoiding pain," proves to 
be important. For in effect homeostasis theories of motivation postulate 
exactly this, that there is indeed no end or object being pursued except 
as a means to the reduction of unpleasant tension--that is, pain. Butler's 
arguments, we must acknowledge, in no way constitute a disproof of such a 
homeostasis theory. As Butler says. 
Indeed the Epicureans, who maintained that absence of pain 
was the highest happiness, might, consistently with themselves, 
deny all affection, and if they had so pleased, every sensual 
appetite too: but the very idea of interest or happiness other 
than absence of pain, implies particular appetites or passions;q. 
these being necessary to constitute that interest or happiness. 
To say "you enjoy music only for the sake of the pleasure it gives you" 





a certain painful state in you" is not. The contribution of Butler's point 
here is that the first of these formulations shares in the superficial 
plausibility of the egoist theory as a whole, and might seem to need no 
justifying. The second at least presents a much more specific hypothesis, 
and one which as Butler says himself is not subject to the criticism that it 
postulates an endless chain of causes. 
The second, and even more important, contribution Butler makes to the 
discussion of philosophical egoism is in pointing out that not one but two 
different kinds of selfishness are actually being discussed. The first, and 
stronger, egoist thesis is that the true content of all desires is selfish 
in the familiar, colloquial sense: my concerns are all ultimately with 
having things (including intangible things like power, fame, admiration) 
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for myself. Hobbes's discussions of pity and charity are in this category. 
The second and weaker thesis is that all desires whatever their content are 
selfish simply by virtue of being desires. I will refer to this sense of 
"selfish" as the weak, or formal, sense. 
For "selfish" in the stronger sense Butler often uses the term 
"interested" (meaning self-interested). Particular desires which are 
selfish only in the weaker, or formal, sense that they belong to the agent, 
may range from benevolent to malicious; they may be compatible with long¬ 
term self-interest or mildly or ruinously self-destructive. The weaker sense 
of selfish, in other words, is compatible with actions of all possible types, 
and certainly implies no necessarily selfish character in the stronger sense. 
For the sake of making this point particularly clear Butler calls all 
specific desires "disinterested," though "not-necessarily-interested" might 
be a less confusing term. Butler himself points out that the choice of terms 
. 
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is not important. What is important is distinguishing between the two 
different senses of "selfish" and recognizing that only one of them applies 
to all desires in a tautological fashion. And this is the one not strong 
enough to establish the egoist claim that no concern except with oneself 
is real. Butler summarizes his own argument very incisively in the preface 
to his published sermons; it is quoted here at length to build up a sense 
of how he uses his own terms in context, and because it presents the essentials 
of the argument so concisely: 
The chief design of the eleventh Discourse is to state the 
notion of self-love and disinterestedness, in order to show 
that benevolence is not more unfriendly to self-love, than any 
other particular affection whatever. There is a strange 
affectation in many people of explaining away all particular 
affections, and representing the whole life as nothing but 
one continued exercise of self-love. Hence arises that 
surprising confusion and perplexity in the Epicureans of old, 
Hobbes, the author of Reflexions, Sentences, et Maximes Morales, 
and this whole set of writers; the confusion of calling actions 
interested which are done in contradiction to the most manifest 
known interest, merely for the gratification of a present passion. 
Now all this confusion might easily be avoided by stating to 
ourselves wherein the idea of self-love in general consists, as 
distinguished from all particular movements towards particular 
external objects; the appetites of sense, resentment, compassion, 
curiosity, ambition, and the rest. When this is done, if the 
words selfish and interested cannot be parted with, but must be 
applied to everything; yet, to avoid such total confusion of all 
language, let the distinction be made by epithets: and the first 
may be called cool or settled selfishness, and the other passionate 
or sensual selfishness. But the most natural way of speaking 
plainly is, to call the first only, self-love, and the actions 
proceeding from it, interested: and to say of the latter, that 
they are not love to ourselves, but movements towards somewhat 
external: honour, power, the harm or good of another: and that the 
pursuit of these external objects, so far as it proceeds from these 
movements, (for it may proceed from self-love) is no otherwise 
interested, than as every action of every creature must, from 
the nature of the thing, be; for no one can act but from a 
desire, or choice, or preference of his own. 
The emphasis on language is crucial here. If "selfish" and "interested" 
are to be applied to all actions, different terms must be found to distinguish 
. 
the particular type of action that these terms were formerly used to single 
out. A distinction itself has not disappeared when the language for making 
it is taken away. Restating Butler's argument, we could say he is pointing 
out that "selfish" in the weak or formal sense ("for no one can act but 
from a desire, or choice, or preference of his own") is being substituted 
for "selfish" in the strong or substantive sense, in constructing the egoist 
argument. A fallacy results from establishing this substitution and then 
reversing it after certain logical relationships have been established. The 
fallacy works as follows: 1) Selfishness (weak sense) is inherent in all 
actions and motives as such. 2) All actions are selfish (still the weak 
sense) by definition, thus on a priori or logical grounds. 3) All actions 
are selfish (now substituting the strong sense) on a priori or logical 
grounds. It is striking that Butler himself, in the passage just quoted, 
describes this type of thinking as "explaining away all particular affections, 
and representing the whole life as nothing but one continued exercise of 
self-love," for it is precisely an instance of reductionism of the explaining- 
away variety, as discussed above, that he has identified. 
Butler's point is ultimately simple, as the error in this line of 
reasoning is simple; but it is elusive until it is recognized. Butler 
responds to the a priori egoist argument with the observation that saying that 
the accomplishment of my desires will satisfy me is not the same as saying 
that my own satisfaction must be the true goal of my action. The first is a 
statement about how the concept of desire is used, and so is indeed true by 
tautology or definition. The second is the egoist thesis—a very different, 
and substantive, claim. A desire is said to be "satisfied" when it is 
fulfilled. This would be true of any desire. It is not a unique 
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characteristic of a desire for "satisfaction" itself. Indeed, it is not clear 
that this last notion makes any sense, unless the notion of "pleasure," with 
its additional sensual connotations, is carelessly substituted for "satisfaction, 
as it often is in these arguments. We have returned to the point made by 
Butler and Frankl that satisfaction presupposes at least some other aims, unless 
it consists entirely of avoidance of pain. 
To say that any desire necessarily involves a desire for its own 
satisfaction seems to be a clumsy and pedantic, but intelligible, way of 
expanding on what "desire" as a concept involves. Saying that any desire is 
necessarily a desire for a certain experience, namely "satisfaction," can be 
derived from this only by a semantic confusion that is essentially nothing 
more than a play on words. And finally, since this experience of satisfaction 
is my experience, the egoist conclusion is drawn that my actions always have 
as their goal states of my own being. By this path, as Austin Duncan- 
Jones suggests in his book on Butler, the egoist position acquires a 
misleading atmosphere of being necessarily true, which it does not deserve. 
The theory of universal selfishness, known as psychological 
egoism, and in one of its forms as psychological hedonism, 
seems to have a perennial life. It has often been refuted by 
philosophers, and Butler's is the classic refutation of it. Yet 
it flourishes still, and is felt by many people to have the force 
of an axiom, whose denial is absurd. There is no doubt that, 
as Butler made plain, its plausibility rests partly on confusions 
about the meanings of words. 7 (my underlining) 
He summarizes the problems in the egoist argument, as elaborated above, 
as follows: 
In short, the generalization that al1 my actions spring from 
my desires or motives proves to be a disguised tautology, 
which must be true, given the accepted meaning of the word 
"action." And this tautology cannot support the conclusion 
that all my performances spring from selfish motives. 




thesis, do not amount to a disproof of that thesis. The validity of a 
position such as philosophical egoism and the validity of any particular 
arguments used in supporting it must be considered separately. All that has 
been shown is that one of the lines of argument supporting the egoist view-- 
and arguably the most influential, because it supports all the case-by-case 
discussion--is not tenable. Philosophical egoism is left as a thesis that 
could be valid, but whose denial cannot be considered absurd. And this is 
important because, as Butler said, many apparently more empirical arguments, 
such as the egoist analyses of specific moral concepts as presented by 
Mandeville and Hobbes, are covertly dependent o the a priori argument. 
Many of their specific analyses would seem strained and unconvincing without 
the backing of the general argument, requiring the acceptance of some kind of 
egoist explanation. In effect, when the flaws in the general argument are 
understood, it becomes apparent that many of the examples are being made to 
fit the theory, rather than supplying it with independent support. 
Butler himself does not claim that purely disinterested action, 
whether helpful, harmful or neutral, in its effects on other people, is 
very common. 
Self-love and any particular passion may be joined together; 
and from this complication, it becomes impossible in numberless 
instances to determine precisely, how far an action, perhaps 
even of one's own, has for its principle general self-love, or 
some particular passion. 
And as Harrison points out, when it comes to constructing a positive theory 
of his own, Butler makes curiously cautious use of his powerful arguments 
against philosophical egoism. For self-interest, or what Butler calls in 
his system "cool self-love," functions in his system as a "regulating 




makes no qualitative distinctions among the particular desires; it seeks a 
numerical maximum of gratified individual desires (though Butler sometimes 
talks as if he considers self-love to have direct aims of its own, as well). 
Butler makes the assumption that aims that are anti-social and selfish in 
the strong sense will be less compatible with other desires than benevolent 
ones will be, so that an identity between the dictates of conscience and those 
of self-love is assured. 
Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, 
always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly 
coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and 
in every instance if we take in the future, and the whole; 
this being.implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration 
of things.iUU 
This assumption allows Butler to make his paradoxical sounding claim that 
the problem in moral life is not that people have too much self-love, but 
that they have too little.^1 Hence they gratify their particular passions 
unwisely, producing harm to themselves and others. 
Harrison contends that Butler ends up granting to self-interest a 
role almost as great as the egoist view would require: 
What happens in Butler's theorising is, in effect, that egoism, 
ejected through the front door by a series of quite serious 
and impressive arguments, creeps in again by the back in the 
respectable guise of a 'rational principle of ordering' and is 
in this guise comfortably recommended as a principle scarcely 
different in its effect from virtue; while virtue, by the same 
token, is made to appear as the prudent man's surest road to 
the maximal satisfaction of his desires. 
Yet Butler has still successfully dismantled the flawed logical argument 
that would seem to compel people to the egoist view. Furthermore, if he 
is somewhat complacent in the belief that self-interest and conscience will 
never conflict, he has nonetheless shown that the common assumption that they 




V. PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY: CONTENT AND PROCESS 
To moral philosophers, deciding what actions, if any, deserve to be 
called "moral" is an important concern. To varying extents, depending on 
the particular philosopher, this involves scrutiny of the motives of an 
action as a basis for making this decision. Perhaps the most extreme 
example of such an approach was that of Kant, who considered only those 
actions to be moral that are done solely for the sake of obeying the moral 
law, although he admitted that there were grave questions about whether any 
such actions could exist and how they would be recognized. 
To modern psychological theorists the question of assigning moral 
value to actions has lost its urgency; indeed, it may be felt that any 
such enterprise would conflict with the goals of theory and therapy alike. 
This attitude is exemplified by the statement Frank! quotes with approval 
from Paul Valery: "Si nous jugeons et accusons, le fonds n'est pas atteint." 
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("As long as we judge and accuse, we do not get to the bottom of things.") 
Nor is a modern psychologist likely to be interested in assigning an overall 
evaluation to "human nature" in terms of ultimate good or evil. Where then 
is the interest, from this point of view, in assessing the claims of the 
philosophical egoist's position? 
We are interested in characterizing and discovering motives, if not 
in judging them, to the extent that they are considered to be far from 
self-evident. Freud established in psychology the notion that a person 
does not have adequate conscious knowledge of his or her motives. As he 
said, 
...Man's craving for grandiosity is now suffering the third 
and most bitter blow brom present-day psychological research 
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which is endeavouring to prove to the "ego" of each one of us 
that he is not even master in his own house, but that he must 
remain content with the veriest scraps of information about what 
is going on unconsciously in his own mind. We psychoanalysts were 
neither the first nor the only ones to propose to mankind that 
they should look inward; but it appears to be our lot to 
advocate it most insistently and to support.it by empirical 
evidence which touches every man closely. 
Hence we are looking, at least in part, for motives which are hidden. This 
is a powerful notion. It allows a great deal of scope for our underlying 
ideas about the nature of motivation and the types of things people desire 
to affect what hidden motives we will find. 
Theories such as that of philosophical egoism have a bearing on our 
expectations about how we will recognize the true, non-obvious motives 
when we find them. If we are convinced in advance of the truth of an 
egoist view, we will reject appeals to non-egoist motivations uniformly as 
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failing to supply a "real" explanation. The argument over philosophical 
egoism is part of an argument over what kinds of motives should be 
recognized as "real." In the case of Freud, egoist assumptions enter 
through his theories about why these hidden motives are not available 
to consciousness; he regards the repressed desires as having a selfish, 
instinctual character that makes them unacceptable to consciousness. If 
on his view it is because of their threateningly amoral character that 
certain desires are not allowed to remain or become conscious, then 
inevitably when he looks for repressed desires they will be of this kind. 
This is not to say that Freud's ideas about why the desires are repressed 
necessarily preceded or shaped his ideas about what kinds of desires they 
are. However, it is clear that these ideas have to be challenged together 
and depend, in part, on each other. 
. 
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It is in relation to this question of where the search for hidden 
motives should stop that Frankl's chief criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis 
can, finally, be framed. As Frank! says, 
All of us have learned the lesson of the greatest spirit in 
psychotherapy, Sigmund Freud. I, too! ...He has taught us 
to unmask the neurotic, to reveal the hidden, unconscious 
motivations underlying his behavior. However, as I never 
tire of saying, unmasking has to stop at the point where the 
psychoanalyst is confronted wit^ghat can no longer be unmasked, 
simply because it is authentic. 
Among the most important motives which Frankl contends are excluded from 
serious consideration in psychoanalytic theory are those involving what he 
has called the noetic realm or the noological dimension; this is the realm 
of intellectual, artistic, moral and religious concerns, and above all of 
self-awareness and self-determination. 
Man passes [into] the noological dimension whenever he is 
reflecting upon himself--or, if need be, rejecting himself; 
whenever he is making himself an object--or making objections 
to himself; whenever he displays his being conscious of himself-- 
or whenever he exhibits his being conscientious. In fact, being 
conscientious presupposes the uniquely human capacity to rise 
above oneself, to judge and evaluate one's own deeds in moral 
and ethical terms. 
What then is man? We ask again. He is a being who continuously 
decides what he is: a being who equally harbors the potential 
to descend tflothe level of an animal or to ascend to the life 
of a saint. 
The noetic is the realm of meaning, which is created in devotion to purposes 
beyond oneself, in real involvement with other people and the world. For 
Frankl a theory that neglects this aspect has left out, not just one factor, 
but the most important one; as he quotes from Nietzsche, "He who knows a 
109 'why' for living, will surmount almost every 'how.'" 
In a therapeutic context, a reductionistic conceptual scheme, 
whatever the heuristic value of its simplifications, must be clearly 
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recognized as such. The type of causality it postulates must not be taken 
to justify pan-determinism. For pan-determinism is, at the very least, 
of no use to a person confronting difficult choices about what to do and 
how to understand his or her history. Freedom and responsibility are for 
Frank! primary features of human life, not to be explained away. Here his 
appeal to the phenomena seems justified; it reminds us that the burden of 
proof is on the people who would systematically deny that these well-known 
experiences are possible or viridical. 
Human existence is, in its essence, noetic. A human being is 
not one thing among others: Things are determining each other, 
but man is self-determining. In actuality, man is free and 
responsible, and these constituents of his spirituality, 
i.e., freedom and responsibility, must never be clouded by ..g 
what is called the reification or depersonalization of man. 
Since noological concerns are characterized for Frankl precisely 
by their conscious character (though he allows they can be unconscious as 
well, especially in people whose ideology prevents their recognition), it 
is important to his position to maintain that some "authentic" motivations 
may not be hidden at all. 
Freud never took a human phenomenon at its face value; or, 
to adopt the formulation used by Gordon W. All port, 
"Freud was a specialist in precisely those motives that 
cannot be taken at their face value." Does this, however, 
imply that there are,no motives at all which should be taken 
at their face value?1 
And finally, the reason all this is so important clinically, he says, is 
that increasingly patients will come to psychiatrists and psychotherapists 
with questions about the meaning of life that they might once have presented 
to a priest, minister, rabbi or other religious counselor. It is extremely 
important that these "noogenic" problems, when present, be recognized by 
the therapist for what they are and addressed without an automatic reduction 
• 
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to the psychodynamic, or biological level. To therapy that addresses these 
concerns on their own terms, where that is appropriate, Frankl gives the 
name of "logotherapy"; as he says it is characterized by an orientation 
toward recognizing the validity--and the limitations—of all the different 
ways of conceptualizing experience, more than it represents a specific 
clinical approach: 
We think of logotherapy as a supplement rather than a 
substitute for psychotherapy in the narrow sense of the word. 
But in addition, logotherapy might also make a contribution 
toward the completion of psychotherapy's picture of man, toward 
a picture of man in all his dimensions, toward a picture that 
also includes the genuinely human, that is, the noological 
dimension. 
If psychotherapy is to remain therapy and not become a 
symptom within the pathology of the time (Zeitgeist), then 
it needs a correct picture of man; it.needs this at least as 
much as it needs an exact technique. 
This can be taken in two different ways, as I elaborated in the previous 
discussion (Section II) of how Frankl construes the role of philosophy in 
psychology. "A correct picture of man" sometimes seems to mean his picture 
of man, presented just as uncritically as any of the limited theories he 
criticizes. But in a deeper way, "a correct picture of man" refers to a 
picture that is not dogmatically bounded by what we think we understand of 
human emotion, thought and action. Biological and psychodynamic theories 
must be recognized as theories whose power is in their generality. As Frankl 
says, the meaning of life is individual; no one can tell another person 
what it is for him or her. And the clinician dealing with an individual 
patient is working, at least in part, with individual meanings of this 
kind, that broad unifying theories were not desiqned to elucidate. "A correct 
picture of man" is not in this sense a static or uniquely specified concept; 




one's intellectual tools, and on sustained awareness of the relative modesty 




I have tried to show how Frank!'s recognition of unacknowledged 
philosophical dimensions involved in metapsychology and in psychotherapy 
can be enriched by consideration of the philosophical context. In the case 
of his rejection of a Baconian conception of psychology as a scientific 
activity free of untestable assumptions, the relevant context is the recent 
debate in philosophy of science over the "theory-laden" character of all 
observation. In the case of his objections to particular assumptions he 
finds shaping modern psychological theory--of which the Freudian pleasure 
principle is by far the most important--I have argued that it is the 
doctrine in moral philosophy called philosophical egoism, rather than the 
pleasure principle as such, that Frankl is really questioning. And since 
he simply rejects philosophical egoism as if its unacceptability were self- 
evident, I have explored the specific arguments brought against the theory 
by Bishop Butler in the eighteenth century. This yielded the conclusion that 
one very persuasive and important a priori argument for that theory is based 
on a fallacy supported, as Butler beautifully demonstrated, by confusions about 
language. But it could not be concluded that Butler had refuted the theory 
of egoism itself, only that his arguments leave it without any strong claim 
to plausibility. Like extreme scepticism of any form, it probably cannot be 
formally refuted. Finally, I have suggested that the clinical search for 
underlying non-obvious or unconscious motives has a point of intersection 
with the tradition of moral philosophy. For philosophical theories such 
as philosophical egoism may shape assumptions about where the search for 
explanation should stop. It is therefore important to articulate such 
theories, and to be aware of their influence and of the arguments that have 
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